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Abstract
Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist
optimal tax devices. Feehan (1990) however reported an error in his …rst-
best rules. The present note criticizes the fundamentals of Besley’s second-
best rules. These rules optimize the welfare or well-being of phantom agents
rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society. The latter
approach however, does not lead to nicely interpretable …rst-order conditions.
Indeed, any attempt to circumvent this non-welfarist interpretation problem
seems to be doomed to fail.
1. Introduction
Slowly, but resolutely, normative economists were convicted that they should
abandon the welfarist framework to be able to givea less narrow-minded account
and a more inspired justi…cation for theirdevicesonoptimal taxesortax reforms.
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economists, compared to the by now almost innumerable amount of welfarist
devices. The reason isthat the non-welfarist analysis sticksto thepoint ofwriting
down …rst-orderconditions formaximizing social ‘welfare’.1 Thisisdueto thefact
that the whole battery ofanalytical tools developed by consumer theory - mainly
Roy’s identity and the structure of preferences [see Corlett and Hague (1953),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976), Deaton (1979, 1981) and Deaton and Stern
(1986) fortheimplicationsofthelatterforoptimal tax rules] -is, by de…nition, no
longer available to the non-welfarist normative economist. So she cannot rewrite
these …rst-order conditions in a way which allows for a neat interpretation of the
results,2 and we will call this the non-welfarist interpretation problem.
A more modest approach departs from the old Musgravian idea to discrimi-
nate between ordinary goods and (de)merit goods.3 It got deeper ground from
the modern-style, so to say enlighted welfarist approach [see Harsanyi (1995,
1997)] which claims that one should not take into account actual preferences of
agents, but reasonable preferences. Such preferences would really give the agent
a maximal amount of utility when choosing its top. Tobacco is the most famous
example. People enjoy smoking, but in the end you will get long cancer (with
a certain probability which is quite high). So, smoking a cigarette would give
you much less utility as what you might think at …rst sight. Hence, “govern-
ment might treat ten cigarettes by its system of value as equivalent to what the
individual smoking those cigarettes would regard to be twenty” (Besley, 1988, p.
374).
Thenext section explains how such reasonable preferences can be constructed
when a (de)merit good is present and also considers di¤erent possible social wel-
fare or well-being functions. Thethird section shows how any attempt to circum-
vent the typical non-welfarist interpretation problem seems to be doomed to fail.
1Maybe ‘well-being’ would be a better term when the objective function intends to be non-
welfarist.
2More recently a new approach to non-welfarist optimal taxes took high ‡ights - see Roe-
mer (1996), Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999) and Maniquet and Fleurbaey (1998) -
but we do not want to go into this strand of the literature.
3For a di¤erent approach which models (de)merit goods as externalities, see Pazner (1972)
and also Decoster and Schokkaert (1989) for an empirical application.
2A fourth and …nal section concludes.
2. Social welfare versus social well-being
We follow Besley’s (1988) notation and denote agent h’s commodity bundle by
the vector (xh; yh), where the goods yh are those goods whose utility potential
could be misjudged by agent h. For simplicity, we also stick to Besley’s (1988)
assumption that yh is a scalar. The actual utility function of agent h is denoted
by:
vh(xh;yh) (2.1)
The function vh is assumed to be increasing in all its arguments, strongly quasi-
concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable. The corresponding indirect utility
function is de…ned on the spaceof prices (p; q) - wherep is the price vector of the
x-goods and q is the price of the (de)merit good y - and on individual incomes
mh. Theindirect utility function gh can be obtained by replacing the commodity
bundle (xh; yh) by (Dh
x(p; q;mh);Dh
y(p;q; mh)), the parametric demand system
which follows from solving the problem:
max





Traditional welfareeconomicsrespectsconsumers’ sovereignty and accordingly
tries to maximize a standard social welfare function, quasi-concave in utilities,








v1(x1; y1); :::;vh(xh; yh); :::;vH(xH; yH)
i
(2.3)
Note that a welfare function is de…ned as a function of functions, a functional
in more technical jargon. But the corner stone of welfarism is the possibility
to replace this functional by a function which evaluates social welfare solely on
the basis of the vector of individual utility realizations of a certain allocation
3of goods. We will not discriminate between the concept of a functional and a
function in the sequel, and assume that W satis…es the welfarism axioms. Using
indirect utility functions, we can more conveniently formulate the traditional
indirect social welfare function in terms of prices and incomes as:
W
h
gh(p;q; mh); h=1;:::; H
i
(2.4)
Let us now focus on the non-welfarist merit good approach and the corre-
sponding social well-being functions. Besley (1988) puts the approach in a clear
way:
Merit good arguments proceed via a pathology of individual choice, i.e. they rest
upon reasons for consumers’ choices being ‘faulty’. The step to an argument for
intervention is then a short one. (Besley, 1988, p. 372)
He furthermore makes precise that “in the simple Utilitarian model value, desire
and hapiness are merged into a single metric, namely utility” (Besley, 1988, p.
372). But he adds that his approach only di¤ers from the traditional framework
by allowing the planner to value the (de)merit good y di¤erently from agents:
We accept an essentially Utilitarian framework whilst permitting the social planner
to recognise that the preferences used to determine consumption may be a ‘faulty’
representation of well-being. It is this divergence upon which we pin our merit good
arguments. (Besley, 1988, p. 372, italics added)
The analysis is premised on the idea that a social planner, or politician, ‘knows best’
but chooses to correct individual preferences in a very speci…c way, i.e. via altering
the valuation of merit goods alone. There is no violation of individual preference
orderings beyond this. (Besley, 1988, p. 382, italics added)
The model is based explicitly on the fact that agents’ preferences are defective in
judging theirown well-being when choosingquantitiesofthemerit good y. Indeed,
Besley seemsonly interestedincorrecting theagents’ valuation of welfaretowards
their‘true’ well-being, and hedoesso inthefollowing speci…cway. Inlinewiththe
cigaretteexample, the‘true’ valuationis simply modelled by rescaling the original
amount of the (de)merit good by a scalar µh so that the ‘true’ utility generating
potential of a quantity yh of the(de)merit good equals µhyh. The good is a merit
good (i.e. it has a higher utility generating potential than originally thought by
agent h) ifµh >1 and a demerit good if0 <µh < 1. The‘true’ valuation function
is then de…ned as:
4Áh(xh; yh) ´ vh(xh; µhyh) (2.5)
This transformation does not a¤ect the properties of the utility function just
stated. If we are only interested in changing the valuation of the agents, then
we have to replace, as before, the commodity bundle (xh; yh) by the parametric
demand system (Dh
x(p; q;mh);Dh








This indeed seems closeto Besley’s description and is according to us a very nat-
ural way to incorporateamerit good argument. Agents make‘faulty’ consumption
choices, but we only changethevaluation, nothing else. It would be ratherstrange
not to take the actual choices or real behaviour into account. For instance, in
case it is not possible “to enforce a speci…c allocation of consumption” (Besley,
1988, p. 377), then a second-best analysis via such a social well-being function
precisely aims at inducing what the social planner considers ‘good’ consumption.
Inducing behaviour is of course only possible if we take actual behaviour into
account.
Ifonesticksto thesamedegreeofinequality aversion asbeforeand ifonewants
the welfarism-axioms, though formulated now in terms of true valuations, to be




vh(xh;µhyh); h= 1;:::; H
i
(2.7)
We deliberately use the same symbol W to denote both the traditional welfare
function and the social well-being function, to stress their similar properties in
the true utility space. For a second-best analysis it is more convenient to rewrite










y(p; q;mh));h= 1; :::;H
i
(2.8)
5Wehave argued that thisindirect social well-being function seemsvery natural to
us and also close to Besley’s description, if we interpret his analysis in a correct
way. The next section however, shows that it di¤ers from Besley’s (1988) social
well-being function. Furthermore, using what we call the ‘correct’ social well-
being function impedes the use of Roy’s identity.
3. Phantoms at work
Supposenow for thesakeof theargument that there isfor each agent h in society
a phantom agent, which determines the optimal allocation (xh; yh) when using
h’s budget constraint, but using Áh as his objective. Alternatively, we could say
that the resulting allocation is equal to that what “the individual would choose
for himself if he had the ‘correct’ preferences” (Besley, 1988, p. 378). Formally:
max
xh;yh Áh(xh;yh) s:t: p0xh +qyh =mh (P.2)
The f.o.c. to this problem are:4
vh
1(¹ ah; µh¹ bh) = Áh
1(¹ ah;¹ bh) = ¹ ¸p
µhvh
2(¹ ah;µh¹ bh) = Áh








the parametric demand system of
the phantom agent for agent h and we can write his indirect utility function as:
hh(p; q;mh) =Áh(Fh
x(p; q;mh);Fh




Notice the di¤erence with what we de…ned as the indirect valuation function in
equation 2.6. We …rst make the following well-known claim:
Claim 1. The indirect utility of the phantom agent for h at prices (p;q; mh),
namely hh(p; q;mh), is equal to agent h’s indirect utility evaluated at prices
(p;
q
µh; mh), namely gh(p;
q
µh; mh).
4Given a function v, the notation vi denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to the
i-th element. These might be vectors of partial derivatives.
6Proof. We …rst show that for any (p;q; mh) 2 IRK+2











This can be shown by checking whether the …rst order conditions of program P.2

































= e ¹h(p;q; mh)q
But these are exactly the …rst order condition for program P.1, when one take
for granted that ¹ ¸ = e ¹
h(p;q; mh) = ¹h(p;
q
µh;mh), where ¹h is the parametric
solution for the Lagrange multiplier in problem P.1 and e ¹
h is a similar function
for problem P.2. The budget condition holds trivially. Since the problem is
assumed to be su¢ciently regular to have a unique solution, this identi…cation
proves the …rst part. The indirect utility of phantom agent h is now given by:










where the last step follows from equation (2.2). ¥
Claim 1 con…rmsequation (2:5) in Besley (1988). However, strangely enough,
Besley (1988) formulates an indirect social well-being function in terms of the
indirect utility functions of the phantom agents. He does not only change the
agents’ valuation of their well-being towards a correct valuation, but, loosely
speaking, also replaces the agents’ behaviour by the correct behaviour. Using









hh(p; q;mh);h =1;:::; H
i
(3.3)
5We assume that x
h is a vector of length K.
7We said we …nd this a strange formulation. This is for the simple reason that
the objective function takes into account the behaviour of agents which simply
do not exist, which is most clear if we rewrite equation (3.3) to obtain:
W
h






y (p;q; mh)); h=1;:::; H
i
(3.4)
and compare this result with equation (2.8). It aggregates the well-being of
phantom agents, and we cannot see what these would tell us about actual well-
being in society. To besure, thecorrect valuation ofthe well-being of individuals
almost always di¤ers from the well-being of phantom agents. This is con…rmed
in the next claim.
Claim 2. For a ‘large’ subset6 of utility functions v under consideration - to wit




with 0 a vector of K zero’s - we have fh 6=hh for all µh belonging to an open and
connnected set around µh = 1.






fh(p;q; mh) = vh(Dh
x(p;q; mh); µhDh
y(p;q; mh))












Our claim will thus be true if:
vh(Dh
x(p; q;mh);µhDh























. Since our assumptions were su¢-
ciently restrictive to guarantee a unique optimum, our claim will be true if:
(Dh
x(p; q;mh);µhDh







6We do not want to be pedantic while giving a technical de…nition of ‘large’.
8This is indeed true since
@Dx(p;q;m)





all µh belonging to an open and connnected set around µh = 1. Note that the
claim does not generally hold for cases with more than one (de)merit good, at
least if some are demerit and others merit goods. We are con…dential however
that the claim remains generically true. ¥
Finally, we claim that a ‘correct’ speci…cation of thesocial well-being function
as in equation (2.8) does not allow one to use Roy’s identity for further analysis:
Claim 3. Amongst the utility functions under consideration, there are cases for
which it holds that:
@fh(p; q;mh)
@q
6= ¡e ¹h(p; q;mh)Fh
y (p; q;mh)
Proof. The proof proceeds simply by constructing an example. Superscripts h
are dropped, since only one agent is considered. We have to prove:
@f(p; q;m)
@q
6= ¡e ¹(p;q; m)Fy(p; q;m)
We use a CES-utility function with elasticity of substitution 2 > ¾ > 1 and the


























































Notice that z(p; q;1) = s(p; q) and z increases in µ given the assumption that











































































In particularly, it will be shown that the LHS of the last equation is greater than
the RHS. One can easily see that:
z(p; q;µ) < µ
¾¡1
¾ s(p;q)
Furthermore, our assumptions guarantee that z(p;q; µ) > s(p; q), so that the



















The last inequality is easily checked to hold for ¾ < 2. This completes the proof.
¥
We conclude with some remarks. First, it was noted in thecourseof theproof
that s(p;q) =z(p;q; 1), asit shouldbe. Furthermore, the inequality doesnot hold
when the substitution elasticity ¾ = 1. In this case we have s(p;q) = z(p; q;µ)
10irrespective of the choice of µ. One may conclude from this that for a Cobb-
Douglas speci…cation of utilities, the analysis of Besley (1988) bites. This might
indicate how a non-welfarist might still proceed following Besley’s lines, though it
does not leave too much room for generality. Finally, a non-welfarist might also
proceed by recalculating all formulas in Besley (1988) using the corrected welfare
ofreal existing agents, but thetypical non-welfarist interpretation problem makes
it a rather disappointing exercise.
4. Concluding remarks
Feehan (1990) shows that Besley (1988) evaluates Roy’s identity at the wrong
point which resulted in a wrong implementation of …rst-best policy, being the





, under the budget restriction
PH
h=1 Th = ¡q
PH
h=1yh.
Thepresent noteclaimsthat theobjectivefunction forderiving second-best policy
rules in Besley (1988) is weird. A to our opinion more appropriate formulation
of the objective however implies that the identity of Roy, resulting from the
behavioral identities of phantom agents, acting according to ‘true’ preferences, is
no longer available for simplifying the obtained results. The analysis sticks then
to the formulation of …rst-order conditions of a maximization problem without
much further insight. This standsto reason, because theessenceofnon-welfarism
is to create a gap between individual behaviour and government’s policy, or to be
moreprecise: between consumers’ evaluation oftheirwell-being and government’s
judgement. The link between behaviour and consumers evaluation of well-being
follows rather from economists’ narrow-minded behavioral assumptions. If the
present note is pertinent, it leaves less hope for theoretical progress, than what
one might hope for at …rst sight from Besley (1988).
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